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I. Introduction  
 
Some biologists have expressed concerns about the potential impact of genetic engineering 
capabilities on biological warfare possibilities almost from the time that such engineering 
became possible.1 Since the mid-1990s there has been an increasing number of such warnings 
both from official sources2 and from practicing microbiologists.3 The medical profession, in 
particular, has expressed increasing concerns over the kinds of agents that may be developed 
and used for hostile purposes.4, 5
 The recent warnings have made it clear that we could well face an increasing range of 
different biological agents being used for hostile terrorist and warfare purposes in the coming 
decades. George Poste6, for example, has emphasised the need to think “beyond bugs”, and, 
more generally, Mathew Meselson has argued convincingly that as the century progresses 
more and more of life’s fundamental processes will become open to both benign and malign 
manipulation.7  
 Such a diversity of possible threats evolving from the ongoing revolution in biology raises 
the very real question of whether a tiered peer-review system as proposed by the Fink 
Committee8, or the tighter system proposed by the Maryland group9, would be adequate – 
even if substantially modified to cover a wider range of agents. The intention of this paper is 
to provide the basis for a discussion of that issue by reviewing a wide range of possibilities in 
regard to the agents that could arise.  
 As a starting point the recent paper written by the US Defense Department analysts Petro 
et al.10 is used as a framework for thinking about future trends as it is perhaps the most 
systematic viewpoint available in the open literature. These authors consider the future 
evolution of biological warfare in three phases: 
 
i./ As there a only a limited number of traditional biological warfare agents suitable for use 
they suggest that the defense will eventually be able to counter all of these. 
 
ii./ Moreover, as there are only a limited number of ways in which traditional agents may be 
effectively modified, the defense will also eventually be able to counter all of these.  
 
iii./ However, as the process described by Meselson continues through the century an ever 
increasing number of targets will become available for which specific Advanced Biological 
Warfare Agents (ABWs) may be designed. Thus the defense will be confronted with the 
problem – should this prediction prove correct – of a diffuse and fundamentally unknowable 
range of potential agents. And some of these, as the recent CIA report noted, could be, “more 
severe than any known agent in their effect.”11 Using this framework the following section 
develops analyses of possible futures in regard to research in microbiology; immunology; the 
nervous systems; animal diseases; and plant diseases.  In each section a current cause of 
concern is used as an introduction, and then possible modification of traditional agents, and 
finally, possible ABWs are discussed.  
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 It is not intended here to ask the question of whether a modified tiered peer-review system 
could cope with such a range of possibilities, but rather to set the stage for a realistic 
discussion of that question.  
 
II. Examples 
 
1.  Immunology – Vulnerability of the Immune System to Modulation 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The immune system plays a crucial role in protecting against infectious diseases. This is 
clearly demonstrated in the case of individuals with genetic defects in certain immune 
mechanisms, which frequently result in a devastating outcome, despite the use of antibiotics 
or other chemotherapeutic agents. Indeed, the pathogenicity of a microorganism can only 
rightly be defined within the scope of its interaction with the immune system. 
 In this age of rapid biomedical and biotechnological advances, far-reaching manipulations 
of microorganisms are now possible that can change their properties drastically. Experiments 
to manipulate microorganisms are being carried out daily, with mostly peaceful aims in mind, 
such as the elucidation of the pathogenic mechanisms of an infectious agent, which could in 
turn point the way to the development of better prophylactic and therapeutic measures to 
counter infections more successfully. 
 However, it has become evident that these experiments can lead to the creation of 
particularly dangerous microorganisms that can evade the immune responses in devastating 
ways.  A prime example is the inadvertent creation of a killer mousepox virus by researchers 
trying to develop a contraceptive vaccine to control the rodent population in Australia.12, 13 
Particularly disturbing is the fact that another scientist, Mark Buller at St. Louis University, 
has picked up on these experiments and carried them some steps further by increasing the 
lethality of the mousepox virus and by carrying out similar manipulations with the cowpox 
virus.14, , 15 16
 Up to now, the focus has been mainly on concerns about the possibilities of manipulating 
the properties of microorganisms to make them more robust and more pathogenic. It becomes 
evident from the example cited above that the real target is the immune system, and how 
vulnerable it is to evasion mechanisms, which naturally potentiate the pathogenicity of the 
infective agents. This represents a change of focus from the microorganism to systems 
biology and how it might be misused. The situation is accentuated by the fact that the 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) of the US National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) has expanded its program significantly in order to attract scientists to the area of 
biodefense research17. Within this program, immunology as it relates to biodefense is given 
special attention. NIAID reported that it awarded a multi-component grant to create an 
“encyclopedia” of innate immunity, a comprehensive and detailed picture of the type of 
immunity that represents the essential first line of defense against infectious diseases.  The 
stated goal of this undertaking is to gain knowledge that could lead to the development of 
treatments for infectious diseases. At the same time, however, this information could provide 
a blueprint for malign attack of the immune system. 
 In order to appreciate the dilemma of dual use and the possibilities of misuse in this area, a 
brief description of scientific and technological aspects underlying research activities in this 
field, including the elements of the innate and the acquired immune systems will be given. 
Also, mechanisms of immune evasion used by some microorganisms will be outlined. With 
this background, examples of research in which microorganisms have been created that evade 
immune defenses will be presented along with an analysis of the dual use aspects involved. 
Finally, a look to possible future threats involving the vulnerability of the immune system will 
be offered. 
 
1.2. Scientific and Technological Background 
 
1.2.1  Mammalian Immune Systems 
 
The hallmark of the immune system is its ability to respond to an invasion of the body by 
microorganisms or toxic components in ways that afford protection against the detrimental 
effects that could occur. The responses of the immune system include both specific (adaptive 
immune system) and non-specific (innate immune system) components. These react in 
different ways to antigens, which are substances foreign to the host.  Components of innate 
and adaptive immunity are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Features of Innate and Adaptive (Specific) Immunity18
 
             Feature     Innate Immunity     Adaptive Immunity 
Characteristics   
Specificity for 
microorganisms 
 
Relatively low (PAMPs)a
 
High (specific antigens) 
Diversity Limited Large 
Specialization Relatively sterotypic Highly specialized 
Memory No Yes 
 
Components 
  
Physical and chemical 
barriers 
Skin, mucosal epithelia; anti-
microbial chemicals e.g. 
defensins 
Cutaneous and mucosal 
immune systems; secreted 
antibodies 
Blood proteins Complement Antibodies 
Cells Phagocytes (macrophages, 
neutrophils), Natural killer 
cells 
Lymphocytes (B cells that 
produce antibodies; T cells 
that carry out cell-mediated 
reactions 
 
aPAMPs: pathogen-associated molecular patterns 
 
 
 
 The innate immune system includes components that are present and ready for action even 
before an antigen challenge is encountered. These are cellular and molecular components that 
are less specific than those of the adaptive system. That is, they are not specific for a 
particular antigen but react to classes of antigenic substances from microorganisms called 
pathogen-associated molecular patterns or PAMPs. Several components of the innate immune 
system must be activated by agonists such as PAMPs, but this activation can occur within 
minutes or hours rather than days. Therefore, innate reponses are quicker, but the immunity 
they afford may not be as effective over as long a period of time as adaptive immunity. 
Nevertheless, the innate immune system represents the all-important first line of defense 
against pathogens and is absolutely essential for keeping an infection in check before adaptive 
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immunity can be induced.  If innate immunity is malignly attacked, the battle against 
infections is lost from the start. 
 The specific components form the basis of adaptive immune responses, which involve the 
actions of B and T lymphocytes. These are the so-called immunocompetent cells of the 
immune system, because they are able to react to an antigen challenge with a high degree of 
specificity. Activation of lymphocytes occurs through engagement of  receptors to specific 
antigens on the cell surface. In the case of B cells, these receptors are membrane-bound 
antibodies. The antigen receptors of T cells are called the T cell receptor (TCR). T cells are 
further subdivided into T helper cells (Th), which carry the identifying CD4 molecule on the 
surface and cytotoxic T cells (CTL or Tc), which carry the CD8 identifying molecule. 
Antigenic signals are transduced from the receptors over signal cascades that are activated in 
the inner part of the cell, leading in the end to the expression of genes controlling the 
biosynthesis of products of the cell. Prominent signal cascades operating in cells of the 
immune system are presented in Figure 1. This activation of lymphocytes to effector cells 
usually takes five to six days, resulting in the production of antibodies by the B lmphocytes 
and other effector molecules by the T lymphocytes. In the course of activation, so-called 
memory cells of both B and T lymphocyte types are developed, which can respond more 
quickly to antigen during a secondary or later challenge. Thus, adaptive immunity affords a 
high degree of protection, but it takes time to be induced. 
 Macrophages occupy a central position in the immune system, being active both in innate 
and adaptive immune responses. In innate immunity, macrophages are activated through 
engagement of receptors on the cell surface by substances called agonists. Most prominent 
among receptors on the macrophage surface are the Toll-like receptors (TLRs). The TLRs 
derive their name from the similarity with the transmembrane receptor protein Toll in the fruit 
fly Drosophila, which is involved in development and in protecting flies against fungal 
infections. This has been termed „an ancient system of host defense“.19
 Up to now, 10 different TLRs (TLR1-TLR10) in humans have been described. These 
molecules contain a characteristic leucine-rich extracellular domain (LLR), which recognizes 
conserved structures of the microorganisms called pathogen-associated molecular patterns 
(PAMPs) and leads in the end through a signaling cascade to the activation of genes that 
control the production of inflammatory cytokines 20, , 21 22 as depicted in Figure 1.  
 Macrophages produce type I interferons (α and β), which are essential for a successful 
defense against many viral infections. They are also potent producers of inflammatory 
cytokines including interleukin 1 beta (IL-1β), IL-6 and tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNFα), 
which mediate reactions designed to fight infections. When these cytokines are produced in 
moderate amounts, they contribute greatly to defense mechanisms directed against pathogens 
and to the healing process in general. If they are produced in particularly large amounts or 
continually during chronic illnesses, this can lead to various disorders such as coronary 
insufficiency, thrombus formation, hypoglycemia,and in some cases even to shock and 
death.23  This makes these activities particularly vulnerable to malign modulation such as by 
targeting the TLRs to induce hyper-responses, or by inhibiting key components in signaling 
cascades that would upset the balance. It is interesting in this regard to note that IL-1 was 
reported to be effective in aerosol form in pulmonary absorption studies carried out by the US 
Army under its medical research program24 [Rosenberg & Burck, 1990]. 
 
 
1.2.2  Innate Immunity of Plants 
 
Plants also exhibit a type of innate immunity, revealed by their resistance to certain 
pathogens.25, 26 Essentially two kinds of reactions are recognized. One is cultivar-specific, and 
involves complementary pairs of pathogen-encoded avirulence genes (AVR) and plant-
encoded resistance (R) genes. The interaction of AVR proteins with plant R proteins elicits 
plant defense reactions. The other kind of reaction involves a large variety of microbe-
associated products resembling the PAMPs described above for mammalian systems. The vast 
majority of plant R proteins that have been characterized resemble modular structures of the 
LRR-containing Toll-like receptors or the more recently discovered intracellular nucleotide-
binding oligomerization domain (Nod)-LRR proteins also implicated in PAMP recognition in 
humans.27
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1.3.1  Antigenic Variation 
There are numerous documentations of microorganisms that frequently vary their antigenic 
composition and are thus able to escape mechanisms of immune defense. The mutation rate of 
antigen genes in several microorganisms is much higher than normal 
 Apart from antigenic variation due to intrinsic high mutation rates, variants may be 
selected due to pressures exerted by the immune system. Those antigens that elicit the 
strongest immune response will be subject to the greatest immune selection pressures, which 
will effect the emergence of sets of discrete, non-overlapping antigenic variants. On the other 
hand, if antigens do not elicit immune responses strong enough to select for discrete strain 
variants, a set of strains might emerge that exhibit cyclical or chaotic fluctuations in frequency 
over time.28
  
1.3.2  Additional Immune Evasion Mechanisms 
 
In addition to antigenic variation, viruses in particular have devised a whole array of 
mechanisms enabling them to evade immune defenses. The large DNA viruses are most 
successful in this respect.29
 One of the most important mechanisms in innate immunity is the complement system. This 
is a group of serum proteins consisting of around 30 factors that circulate in the serum in an 
inactive state. Complement can be activated by a variety of specific and non-specific 
immunologic mechanisms.30 The vital role of complement in immune defense can be seen in 
individuals with a genetic defect in component C3, a central protein in the complement 
cascade. This condition has been termed virtually „incompatible with life“.31 However, 
unrestrained complement activation would cause severe damage to bystander cells, so that 
complement activity is held in check by a variety of membrane-bound and soluble regulatory 
factors, designated regulators of complement activation (RCA). Members of the poxvirus, 
herpesvirus and retrovirus families produce homologues that mimic RCA proteins and are 
thus able to escape complement attack.32, 33
 Cytokines and chemokines are soluble substances of relatively small molecular weight 
produced by cells of the immune system, which act as messengers to regulate and direct a 
variety of essential steps in immune responses. The activities of the inflammatory cytokines 
IL-1β, TNFα and IL-6 have been referred to above. Other cytokines such as IL-10, IL-12, IL-
4 and IL-2 are essential in directing the activities of different arms of the immune system, 
such as humoral vs. cell-mediated responses. One of the most interesting mechanisms 
identified in recent years is the mimicry of cytokines and cytokine receptors by large DNA 
viruses (herpesviruses and poxviruses).34 Chemokines are small proteins that play a key role 
in the recruitment of immune defense cells into areas of injury or infection during an 
inflammatory response. Poxviruses use essentially three strategies to modulate chemokine 
functions: (1) through the production of virus-encoded chemokine-receptor homologs, (2) 
through the production of virus-encoded chemokine homologs and (3) through the production 
of virus-encoded chemokine-binding proteins.35  
 A further immune evasion strategy includes the production of a variety of viral inhibitors 
of apoptosis, the so-called programmed cell death. In addition, cytotoxic T cells or Tc cells 
recognize a cell that has been infected by a virus through the presentation by that cell of 
fragments of viral proteins bound to major histocompatibility complex (MHC) molecules of 
class I on the surface of the infected cell. This recognition leads to the activation of Tc 
lymphocytes which attack and kill the cell through the induction of apoptosis. Among other 
things, viruses can interfere with antigen fragment processing or cause the downregulation of 
MHC I molecules, which would protect the cell from cytotoxic T lymphocyte destruction.36
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 Alternatively, viruses such as cytomegalovirus upregulate the expression  of a non-
classical MHC-I molecule that can bind an inhibitory receptor on the surface of natural killer 
cells, inhibiting this innate response to infection.37
 
 
1.4  Dual-use Aspects of Biomedical Research 
 
There are four categories of manipulations or modifications of microorganisms and their 
products that have been the subject of discussion since the onset of the development of 
genetic engineering: (1) the transfer of antibiotic resistance to microorganisms, (2) 
modification of the antigenic properties of microorganisms, (3) modification of the stability of 
the microorganism toward the environment and (4) the transfer of pathogenic properties to 
microorganisms.38, 39 All four types of manipulations are being carried out daily in research 
programs that have legitimate and basically peaceful aims, such as the elucidation of the 
mechanisms of microbial pathogenesis. This research is essential for developing better means 
of combatting infectious diseases. At the same time, these techniques can be misused to 
produce new types of biological agents that could be used as weapons. In order to focus more 
directly on the dangers involved, two specific examples of work from the recent literature that 
have produced dangerous microorganisms which are able to evade vital immune mechanisms 
will be examined. 
 
1.4.1  Accidental creation of a „killer“ mousepox virus 
 
The potential dangers that may be associated with biological research are particularly evident 
in recent studies in the area of immunology. The headlines in the journal New Scientist 
proclaimed „Disaster in the making. An engineered mouse virus leaves us one step away from 
the ultimate bioweapon“.40 The report was about experiments carried out by australian 
researchers who tried to make mice infertile, as a model for controlling rodent populations.41, 
42 The experimental strategy was to incorporate a gene for the production of a protein that is 
found on the surface of egg cells of the mouse into the genome of a mousepox virus, against 
which the mice used in the experiment were resistant. When the mice were infected with the 
recombinant virus, the egg cell protein was over-produced, and an antibody response to that 
protein was mounted, which was supposed to cause infertility in the mice. Indeed, the 
expected antibody response occurred, but it was short-lived.43 In order to boost these antibody 
responses and prolong their effects, another gene was introduced into the mousepox virus 
genome. This gene was to direct the production of a substance called interleukin 4 (IL-4), 
which is known to enhance antibody-type immune responses. However, IL-4 also suppresses 
the activation and expansion of another type of T-lymphocyte (Th1) that provides essential 
help to cytotoxic T-lymphocytes (CTL or Tc) needed to fight viral infections. When mice 
were infected with the recombinant virus, the IL-4 produced did boost antibody responses to 
the mouse egg protein, but at the same time it also suppressed the activation of CTLs. As a 
result, most of the mice (60 %) died, even though they were supposed to be resistant to the 
virus.44
 The mousepox virus is not infective for humans. However, there is some concern that the 
same manipulations might be performed on a pox virus that does infect humans, with 
devastating results. 
 This work has been continued by Mark Buller, a professor at St. Louis University.  Buller 
constructed a recombinant mousepox virus containing the IL-4 gene that was even more 
deadly than the one made by Jackson and co-workers. By placing the IL-4 gene in a region of 
the virus genome that was dispensable and by optimizing its expression, 100 % mortality of 
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the resistant mice was achieved with the recombinant virus construct. Buller’s stated 
motivation was to explore possible prophylactic and therapeutic defenses against such an 
agent. However, vaccination or treatment of mice with the antiviral substance cidofovir plus 
antibodies to IL-4 still did not protect them adequately against a challenge with the highly 
virulent mousepox constructs.45  
 Now he has apparently gone one step further to alter the cowpox virus, which can infect 
humans, in a similar way46 Buller asserted, however, that this virus would only be lethal in 
mice and not in humans, because he used the mouse IL-4 gene, which is specific for only the 
mouse immune system. The head of the Australian research team, Ian Ramshaw, maintains 
that there was no reason to do the cowpox experiments. He further cautions that while viruses 
containing the mouse IL-4 gene should not be lethal in humans, recombinant viruses can have 
unexpected effects. Indeed, it has been pointed out 47 that these experiments fall into several 
categories listed by a recent National Research Council Report48 as being research of 
particular concern.     
 
1.4.2  Potentiation of the Virulence of Vaccinia Virus 
 
The smallpox virus Variola major causes a serious, virulent infection in humans, while the the 
virus that is used for vaccination against smallpox, vaccinia virus, usually causes only a very 
mild or even inapparent infection, at least in individuals with an intact immune system. A 
probable virulence factor for the smallpox virus is the smallpox inhibitor of complement 
enzymes (SPICE). This component has the ability to inactivate human C3b, one of the key 
complement components that serve to induce phagocytosis, thus attacking innate immunity in 
a vital area. Vaccinia virus also has a complement regulatory protein called vaccinia virus 
complement control protein (VCP), which is, however, much less effective (100-fold less) 
than SPICE. In the work described,49 researchers mutated the VCP gene of vaccinia virus to 
have the same nucleotide sequence as SPICE. The recombinant mutant VCP proved to be 
much more efficient than normal VCP in inactivating complement in vitro. Although the 
researchers did not actually outfit vaccinia virus with this mutated gene, the work was only 
one step away from this manipulation. Presumably, vaccinia virus with the mutated gene 
would be much more pathogenic. 
 These experiments illustrate the absolute dual use dilemma of research in the biotech 
sector. While such experiments create microorganisms that pose a greater risk than do normal 
ones and the advisability of their undertaking is certainly open to question, there may at the 
same time be benefits from such research. In this respect, the National Research Council 
report states that “even experiments that have the greatest potential for diversion to offensive 
applications or terrorist purposes may also have potentially beneficial uses for public health 
promotion and defense”.50  This points up the difficulty in imposing blanket prohibitions on 
certain research activities from the start, but clearly emphasizes the need for oversight of 
research of BW relevance. These aspects will be discussed further in the last chapter. 
 
 
1.5  Future Threats 
 
1.5.1  Targeted Delivery Systems: Gene Vectors and Immunotoxins 
 
Targeted delivery systems are components that allow an activity to be targeted to a particular 
site in the body where its activity is desired. An example of such a sytem are viruses that are 
used as vectors to transfect a foreign gene into cells for the purpose of immunization or for 
gene therapy. The gene would become active in infected cells, leading to the production of the 
gene product. Vaccinia virus has been investigated for these purposes because of its large 
genome, which can carry several foreign genes at once, and its effectiveness as a vaccine.51, 52 
There has been a great deal of work in recent years on the possibility of using adenoviruses as 
gene vectors. These viruses can be produced at high titers (up to 1010 per milliliter) and they 
also have a carrying capacity of up to 40 kb of insert DNA.53, 54 Alternatively, the 
development of adeno-associated viruses as vectors for gene delivery seems promising, as 
these viruses are defective by nature and have thus never been shown to have any pathogenic 
effects in humans.55 However, latest investigations have shown that these viruses do indeed 
integrate into the host genome more frequently than presumed, which might lead to 
detrimental mutations including the induction of cancerous states,56 so that there are still 
serious safety concerns about the use of these vectors. 
 It is conceivable that the immune system could be attacked by outfitting viruses with 
specificities for immune cells (e.g. the specificity of the AIDS virus) and toxin genes.  
 Another prime example of a targeted delivery system are immunotoxins. These are 
molecules that contain the antigen binding specificity portion of an antibody molecule 
coupled to a toxin molecule. The aim is to target the toxin activity to specified cells, such as 
tumor cells; in this case, the antibody specificity is directed against tumor cell antigens.57 An 
example of an immunotoxin using ricin as the toxic component is presented in Figure 2.58  
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such as in the case of fusion proteins or immunotoxins, successful delivery by the aerosol 
route would depend greatly upon the physical-chemical properties of that vector. In its 
medical research work on endogenous bioregulators the US Army has for example reported 
that the hormone insulin and the cytokine interleukin-1 were effective in aerosol form in basic 
pulmonary absorption studies.60   
 Targeted delivery systems have to be characterized as being strongly dual-purpose. While 
they may be potentially very useful in vaccine and gene therapy, they can also serve as 
delivery vehicles for toxins or bioregulators in a negative way.  
 
 
1.5.2  Immunization with plant foods 
 
There is at present a great deal of interest in developing vaccines as plant foods. This involves 
the transfer of a gene encoding the antigen of interest into the genome of plants, with 
subsequent expression of that gene and biosynthesis of the antigen in the plant tissues. Eating 
the plant tissues would then deliver the antigen to the gut, where it would be taken up by 
special epithelial cells of the small intestine (M cells) and transferred to the underlying 
lymphoid tissues, resulting in an immune response to that antigen. There would be several 
advantages of inducing an immune response in this way, including increased safety, economy 
and stability of the vaccine, as well as the prospect of inducing mucosal immunity (to localize 
immunity at mucous membrane sites, where most infections begin).61, 62
There are, however, numerous technical and immunological hurdles that have to be overcome 
in order for plant vaccines to be practical. One of the first is the avoidance of degredation of 
the antigen in the digestive tract. Even if the antigen would survive this degredation, oral 
tolerance mechanisms would have to be overcome which prevent immune responses to the 
microorganisms residing in the intestine or to protein antigens aquired continually in food. 
Furthermore, oral immunization usually requires multiple doses in larger amounts than 
antigen administered over parenteral routes; responses are weak, unreliable and also shorter 
lived.63, 64 Indeed, results to date show that immunization with plant foods is in some cases 
possible, but the responses are usually modest and appear only after more than one dose.   
 This discussion serves to illustrate that immunization with plant foods is by no means 
readily achievable. In this regard, it is unlikely that these techniques can be used successfully 
in the very near future in malign ways, e.g. for vaccination of unaware populations, thus 
forcing upon them an involuntary immunity or marking them as possible targets. 
Nevertheless, there is great interest in developing such vaccines for peaceful use and 
improvements are actively being sought, 65, 66 so that developments in this area should be 
closely monitored.  
 
1.5.3  Vulnerability of the Immune System to Modulation after Immunization 
  
 Activation of the immune system in response to an infection is a vital step in countering 
the threat posed by the causative agent. Nevertheless, activation of components of the 
immune system is invariably associated with the enhanced production or exposition of 
predictable markers, that could serve as targets for the delivery of a biological weapon to 
those sites. 
 B and T lymphocytes are produced during development and prior to encountering antigens 
by rearrangement of genes to yield an enormous number of clones, each expressing a unique  
receptor (membrane-bound antibodies in the case of B cells and the TCR in the case of T 
cells) recognizing a particular antigen epitope and thus being able to respond to that antigen.67 
Initially, only a small subset of these clones (estimated at around 0.1 percent) are able to 
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recognize any one particular antigen.68 To generate effective immunity, these naive or resting 
B cells and T cells must undergo clonal expansion in response to an antigen challenge in order 
to amass the numbers required to counter an infection. This represents a considerable 
expansion of antigen-specific lymphocytes in response to immunization, especially when a 
vaccine is given in several doses over a period of time. 
 These expanded clones of B and T lymphocytes have an enhanced vulnerability, for 
example, to being targeted with constructed toxins as discussed earlier (targeted delivery 
systems). For delivery to B cells, a delivery system might be a fusion protein consisting of the 
specific antigen (against which the B cells are directed) fused to the toxic chain of a toxin 
molecule (such as the A chain of ricin or diphtheria toxin). However, since B cells release 
antibodies to the antigen, the construct might be neutralized and cleared by these antibodies 
before it could do much damage. T cells might be a more vulnerable target, as they do not 
secrete their antigen receptors. However, the delivery system containing the toxin would have 
to be constructed in a way as to include the specific antigen fragment bound to MHC 
molecule epitopes in order for it to be recognized and engaged by the T cell. This would be a 
tall order at present, but new studies are providing greater insight into the fine points of the 
recognition of antigen presented by MHC molecules to T cells69 that could make this 
approach more cause for concern in the future. 
 In addition to the expansion of specific antigen receptors, immunization also up-regulates 
the exposition of an array of molecules on the surface of lymphocytes and macrophages. 
Prominent ones include MHC molecules on lymphocytes and macrophages, CD40 on B cells 
and macrophages, or CD28 and CD40L on T cells. All of these would be vulnerable to attack 
for example with immunotoxins consisting of antibodies to these surface components bound 
to the toxic chain of a toxin. 
 Whereas most protein antigens are recognized only by a small fraction of lymphocytes, a 
number of natural proteins have been described that can react with a significant proportion of 
T cells (up to 5 % of the T cell population)70 and some that can bind with up to 50 % of the B 
cell population.71  Through binding of these so-called superantigens, the cells undergo an 
increased rate of apoptosis or cell death. The possibilities for misuse here are intricately 
involved with dual use aspects of targeted delivery systems.  
 
 
 
1.5.4  Vulnerability of the Immune System in Interaction with the Neuroendocrine  
            Systems 
 
It is being recognized more and more that the the immune system interacts intricately and 
extensively with the nervous and the endocrine systems. This topic will be dealt with more 
thoroughly in the next section, but suffice it to say here in the present context that there is a 
fine network of checks and balances exerted on the operation of all three systems by the 
elements within these systems. The perturbation of one system will invariably affect the 
operation of the others. The immune system is particularly vulnerable to modulations of the 
nervous/endocrine systems by bioregulators which include substances active in the nervous 
system affecting behaviour.72 All three systems are interconnected through the hypothalamus-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis via cytokines, hormones, neurotransmitters, peptides and their 
receptors, and also through hardwiring of neural and lymphoid organs and even cells of the 
immune system themselves.73
 Some recent work illustrates the fact that these systems have apparently evolved together 
over time during the evolution of complex multicellular organisms. Anti-microbial peptides 
represent an ancient form of defense, involved in innate immunity as discussed earlier. 
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Similarities between pathogen recognition, signalling pathways and effector mechanisms in 
innate immunity of insects, mammals and plants have been referred to above. In this regard, 
newly characterized neuropeptides that exert anti-bacterial and anti-fungal activities have 
been reported recently.74 These peptides are therefore active not only in the neuroendocrine 
system, but also in innate immunity and most likely play a role in inflammatory processes.  
2. Neuroscience - The Threat from Incapacitating Biochemical Agents 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In October 2002 a group of Chechen separatists took control of a Moscow theatre and held 
800 people hostage. After three days the Russian authorities ended the siege by pumping an 
aerosolised chemical incapacitating agent into the auditorium through the ventilation system.  
Allowing at least 30 minutes for the agent to take affect on hostages and hostage-takers alike, 
troops then stormed the building and shot and killed the majority of the hostage-takers.75  
 A number of months prior to this incident, in response to concerns over commercial 
airline security following the events of 11 September 2001, the US National Institute of 
Justice (NIJ) completed a report entitled Less-Than-Lethal Weaponry for Aircraft Security.76  
The Director of NIJ summarized the conclusions of the report in a statement to the House of 
Representatives. In the section covering the potential for use of chemical incapacitating agents 
she stated that:  
 
“Anesthetics or calmative chemicals could, in principle, be developed into a system whereby they could 
be remotely released into the cabin in order to incapacitate all passengers, and the hijackers, until the 
plane can be landed safely.”77
 
 Unfortunately there was not a safe outcome in Moscow. Over 120 hostages died as a 
result of exposure to the incapacitating agent and many survivors needed hospital treatment.78  
This incident emphasized the danger of devising a discrete ‘non-lethal/less-lethal’ category 
for chemical incapacitants that would separate them from other toxic chemicals with the 
potential to cause lethal effects.79 Also, you only have to alter the aircraft scenario slightly to 
see the problems that could arise if the hijackers rather than the airline were armed with 
chemicals that could incapacitate everyone on the plane. Experts have warned of this ‘double-
edged sword’80.   
 
 After an inexplicable delay of several days after the Moscow siege the Russian Health 
minister finally released the identity of the agent used, stating that it was a  ‘fentanyl-based’ 
compound.81 Although there is some debate as to whether it was a mixture of compounds or 
perhaps a novel agent82, a number of experts believe that carfentanyl, an analogue that is 30 
times more potent than fentanyl, was most likely a major constituent.83 Fentanyl and 
analogues are synthetic opioid analgesics that exert their major effects through action on µ 
opioid receptors in the central nervous system (CNS). The main side effect of fentanyl, which 
is commonly used in clinical anaesthesiology having been introduced in the 1960’s84, is 
respiratory depression. This is thought to have been a major factor in the death of so many in 
Moscow. The effect of opioid agonists such as the fentanyls can be reversed by the non-
selective opioid antagonist, naloxone. One recent paper discussing the implications of events 
in Moscow commented: 
 
“In the United States, naloxone, for a long time a critical antidote to treat heroin overdose and 
iatrogenic opioid toxicity, has now become a crucial component of our chemical warfare antidote 
repository.”85
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 Before looking at some of the potential agents we could face now and in the not-too-
distant future, it is worth emphasising the overlap of chemistry and biology in this area. 
Substances that can influence CNS functions by action on specific receptor sites can have 
either a synthetic chemical origin or a natural biological origin. Wheelis has termed these 
substances potential biochemical weapons.86
 
 
2.2  Possible Modification of Traditional Agents 
 
Military interest in incapacitants has a long history.87  Fentanyl was being investigated as a 
potential weapon by the US military in the 1960’s.88  Other agents under consideration by the 
UK and US at this time were a group of psychoactive compounds called the glycolates89 that 
interfere with acetylcholine metabolism. One of these, BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate), was 
subsequently weaponized by the US. 90 There are also reports that the Former Soviet Union 
developed a derivative of BZ as a weapon91 and Iraq’s chemical weapons program may have 
incorporated a related glycolate compound known as Agent 15.92  BZ was eventually rejected 
by the US as a suitable weapon due to its non-specific and unpredictable effects.93   
 Since then there have been significant developments in neuroscience. The 1980’s saw the 
identification of numerous peptide neurotransmitters that mediate chemical transmission in 
the nervous system alongside ‘classical’ neurotransmitters such as acetylcholine. It is work 
during the past 10-15 years that has revolutionized the field however. The impact of genomics 
has led to a greater understanding of receptor systems and the elucidation of the structure and 
function of certain receptor sub-types that have now become targets for therapeutic drugs. 
Concurrently another enabling technology, combinatorial chemistry, has allowed the 
screening of large numbers of compounds to find those affecting these specific receptor 
targets.94 As well as offering the opportunity to develop more effective new drugs to treat a 
variety of mental illnesses, as is a priority of the global pharmaceutical industry, this 
knowledge is of course dual use.95
 Might the cholinergic system in the CNS now be targeted more specifically by 
weaponeers? The muscarinic acetylcholine receptors (there are 5 sub-types), which are 
thought to have a CNS role in motor control, temperature regulation, cardiovascular 
regulation, and memory, are potential targets.96 The M2 inhibitory autoreceptor regulates 
levels of acetylcholine release at muscarinic synapses and it has been suggested that a specific 
and potent agonist for this receptor could impact these fundamental acetylcholine-mediated 
processes in the body.97
 Military interest in incapacitants never receded98 but it has gained new impetus through 
these scientific advances. Events in Moscow are likely, if anything, to have heightened this 
attention.99 One of the main recommendations of the 2003 report on non-lethal weapons 
(NLWs) science and technology, compiled by the Naval Studies Board of the US National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS), was for increased research on incapacitating chemicals, or 
‘calmatives’ as they are termed by the US military, and their delivery systems.100 The report 
indicated that calmatives are now being studied at the US Army Edgewood Chemical 
Biological Center (ECBC) after a “…lull in R&D for 10 years”. One project is a sponge 
projectile designed to deliver a ‘dose’ of a fentanyl derivative. 
 In October 2000, two years before the Moscow siege, The Applied Research Laboratory at 
Pennsylvania State University, whose scientists have worked closely with the Joint Non-
Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) of the US military for a number of years, published a 
report entitled The Advantages and Limitations of Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal 
Technique.101  It points out that potential calmatives are “…compounds known to depress or 
inhibit the function of the central nervous system”, including “…sedative-hypnotic agents, 
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anesthetic agents, skeletal muscle relaxants, opioid analgesics, anxiolytics, antipsychotics, 
antidepressants and selected drugs of abuse.”  Their analysis of the available literature 
identified several classes of compound they considered to have high potential for use as 'non-
lethal' calmatives. These, along with their sites of action in the nervous system, can be seen in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Selected calmatives102
 
Drug Class Site of Action 
Benzodiazepines GABA receptors 
Alpha2 Adrenergic Receptor Agonists Alpha2-adrenergic receptors 
Dopamine D3 Receptor Agonists D3 receptors 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake 5-HT transporter 
Serotonin 5-HT1A Receptor Agonists 5-HT1A receptor 
Opioid Receptors and Mu Agonists Mu opioid receptors 
Neurolept Anesthetics GABA receptors 
Corticotrophin-Releasing Factor CRF receptor 
Cholecystokinin B receptor antagonists CCKB receptor 
 
Many of these classes of compounds could clearly be used for harmful purposes. We have 
already discussed the effects of µ opioid agonists in the context of fentanyl (and analogues).  
The report examines a drug called dexmedetomidine, which is a selective agonist of the α2A 
adrenergic receptor, the sub-type that plays an important role in sedation.103 Work by the US 
military during the 1990’s to develop α2 adrenergic agonists as weapons for the non-lethal 
weapons program has been documented.104 Neuropeptide transmitter systems are also 
discussed in the report.  CCK-B receptor agonists can induce panic attacks in humans and the 
authors suggest the use of CCK-B antagonists as potential anxiolytic calmative agents.  
Another neuropeptide, Substance P (not mentioned in the report), is thought to be involved in 
depression and anxiety and it has been suggested that, since receptor antagonists reduce these 
systems, agonists may induce them.105 Clearly there may be opportunities for misuse of potent 
selective agonists affecting these two receptor systems. 
 One ‘classical’ neurotransmitter that receives attention in the Pennsylvania State report is 
serotonin (5-HT). Serotonin is widely distributed in the nervous system and has been 
implicated as having a role in many types of human behaviour.106 Of interest to those 
developing incapacitants is its role in sleep, mood, and aggression. One document that has 
recently come to light is a research proposal from 1994 from the US Army Edgewood 
Research, Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC) (now Edgewood Chemical 
Biological Center (ECBC)) that sets out an idea for a potential calmative.107 In the proposal, a 
calmative is defined as: 
 
“… an antipersonnel chemical that leaves the victim awake and mobile but without the will or ability to 
meet military objectives or carry out criminal activity.”108
 
It goes on to report the observations of a University Professor of Anaesthesiology on the 
“profound calming effect” of a serotonin antagonist, structurally similar to ketanserin, in wild 
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elk that are normally unapproachable.109  It is suggested in the proposal that this chemical or a 
related compound “… should be an ideal candidate calmative agent.” The first part of the 
feasibility study proposed was to carry out a literature search: 
 
“…to correlate chemical structure of serotonin antagonists to serotonin receptor subtypes” and to “… 
determine receptor subtype connected with both desired and undesired pharmacological effects.” 
 
The exact mechanisms by which serotonin affects certain behaviours such as aggression is not 
fully understood. However, human and animal studies have shown that increased serotonergic 
function is associated with decreased aggressive behaviour and vice-versa.110  Studies in 
animals have provided other insights; in monkeys: 
 
“It is clear that serotonin does not simply inhibit aggression; rather, it exerts a controlling influence on 
risky behavior, which includes aggression.”111
 
Having reviewed the literature in this area the authors of the 2000 Pennsylvania State study 
point out that: 
  
“It is hypothesised that the increase in the amount of serotonin leads to improved control of behaviours 
linked to this transmitter system, which include aggression, agitation, anxiety, general affect (mood), 
and sleep, among others.”112
 
 One potential calmative technique they suggest is the use of a selective 5-HT1Areceptor 
antagonist, which “…would reduce symptoms of anxiety in an individual or individuals and 
promote a calmer and more compliant behavioral state.”113 One such compound, buspirone is 
used clinically to treat anxiety, and they note that numerous others are under development in 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
 As for the two military proposals in 1994 to develop specific incapacitant weapons 
including those acting on the 5-HT system (the other was to develop synthetic opioid 
agonists), their fate in unclear.114 However, the author of those proposals subsequently 
worked as a senior researcher at Optimetrics Inc., which won a contract with the Department 
of Defense in early 2000 to carry out the first phase of study to assess incapacitants for use in 
military and law-enforcement applications.115  This phase, which is now complete,116 is 
described in the contract solicitation as follows: 
 
“Phase I studies will consist of a Front End Analysis comprising the following elements: review 
existing data on the candidate agents; define scenarios of use and operational parameters; conduct range 
finding toxicological animal tests, and correlate results with those from previous studies.”117
 
Meanwhile, objectives listed in the JNLWD’s Technology Investment Project for ‘Front End 
Analysis of Nom-Lethal Chemicals’ for the fiscal year 2001/02 included:118
 
- Identify advances in the pharmaceutical industry and elsewhere for potential non-lethal 
applications  
- Conduct military user workshops to identify range of desired operational effects 
- Create a searchable database of potential candidates 
- Provide a list of promising candidates to Judge Advocate General’s office for preliminary legal 
review 
 
 Writing in early 2003, the University Professor who had contributed to the 1994 proposal 
to explore serotonin antagonists as incapacitants reflected on events in Moscow. Recognizing 
the dangers of employing fentanyl and other opioids he goes on to say: 
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“However, remarkable progress has been made in the techniques to deliver immobilizing agents and in 
the development of safer, faster-acting potent compounds of extremely short duration in the last decade.  
Much of this work is either privileged or currently not available to the public and therefore 
unpublished.” 
 
 
2.3  Future Threats - Possible Advanced Biological Warfare Agents (ABWs) 
 
A 2001 review of bioregulators with potential for use in bioterrorism emphasized the varied 
nature of these compounds: 
 
“Bioregulators are structurally diverse compounds that are capable of regulating a wide range of 
physiologic activities, such as bronchial and vascular tone, muscle contraction, blood pressure, heart 
rate, temperature, and immune responses.”119
 
Those reviewed included cytokines, eicosanoids, plasma proteases, neurotransmitters and 
hormones. It is important to place this discussion in historical perspective. The Soviet 
biological weapons effort, ostensibly halted in 1992, included programs, championed by the 
most influential biomedical scientist of the time, to develop bioregulators as weapons: 120, 121
 
“He [Yuri Ovchinnikov] saw a way around arms control treaties and weapons conventions by using 
microbes to produce biologically active substances that would replace classic chemical weapons; their 
production could then be concealed in the biotechnology or pharmaceutical industry.”122
 
 But what of the systems biology approach to agent design of which Petro et al. warn, that 
may enable targeting of certain biological processes to produce a variety of effects including 
“…death, incapacitation, or neurological impairment.”123   
 Some examples can be seen from consideration of the interconnectivity between the 
nervous, immune, and endocrine systems. In the past 25 years it has emerged that immune 
regulation is influenced by the brain and that neural and endocrine functions are influenced by 
the immune system.124 These systems also share the same means of communication through 
hormones, neurotransmitters, cytokines, and their respective receptors.125  One well-known 
communication ‘route’ between these systems is the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) 
axis, which is the major system co-ordinating the body’s response to stress.126  Under 
conditions of stress the hypothalamus region of the brain releases corticotrophin-releasing 
factor (CRF), which in turn causes the release of adrenocorticotrophin hormone (ACTH) from 
the pituitary gland. ACTH in the blood results in release of glucocorticoid hormones that 
regulate metabolism and immune function. Glucocorticoids have a negative feedback effect 
on CRF and ACTH release. Other neurotransmitters are also involved in regulating the HPA 
axis. It is known that disturbances in this system have significant effects: over stimulation of 
the HPA axis and excessive production of glucocorticoids leads to immune suppression and 
increased susceptibility to infection while under stimulation resulting in lower glucocorticoid 
levels can lead to inflammation and autoimmune conditions.127 Clearly, this system is open to 
influence at several levels and could be a target of weapons designers. In addition, a dual-
acting weapon could combine a substance that suppresses immunity with a pathogenic 
microorganism for increased effect, or a non-pathogenic bacterium with a plasmid expressing 
a gene for say CRF production might cause immune suppression in the target person(s). The 
Pennsylvania State report looked at the actions of CRF in the brain alone rather than within 
the HPA axis. They propose that CRF antagonists might be used to produce “…a calm 
behavioral state” because of the role of CRF1 and CRF2 receptors in the brain in anxiety and 
stress.128
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 Another example of potential interference at the systems level relates to cytokines. One 
recent review of psychoneuroimmunology pointed out that chronic inflammation, marked by 
increased production of proinflammatory cytokines, “…had been suggested as one key 
biological mechanism that may fuel declines in physical function leading to frailty, disability, 
and, ultimately, death.” 129  Interleukin-6 (IL-6) is especially implicated in this process since 
“…the age associated rise in IL-6 has been linked to lymphoproliferative disorders, multiple 
myeloma, osteoporosis, and Alzheimer’s disease.”130  Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
IL-6 may be a general marker of health deterioration.131  Interestingly depression and stress 
have also been seen to increase production of IL-6.132  Might a weapon agent that enhances 
IL-6 production and thereby increases chronic inflammation actually contribute to a ‘speeding 
up’ of the ageing process? 
3  Anti-Animal Threats 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This section of the paper will address the threat of anti-animal biological warfare. The 2001 
epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the UK provides a contemporary example of 
the continuing impact of animal disease outbreaks. A brief history of anti-animal biological 
warfare (AABW) is provided to establish the precedent of the deliberate instigation of animal 
diseases. General themes, drawn from this history, enable a discussion of the impact of 
advances in the biological sciences and their implication for the anti-animal threat. This is 
highlighted by an examination of the potential role of prions in AABW. The section 
concludes with an examination of the potential for a future threat from this form of warfare, 
with particular attention being played to the role of bioinformatics. 
 
3.2  The 2001 FMD Epidemic in the UK 
 
On 20 February 2001, the presence of FMD was confirmed in Essex marking the beginning of 
the 2001 epidemic in the UK. The disease spread rapidly, the number of confirmed cases rose 
almost exponentially for the first five weeks. The rate at which new cases occurred then 
peaked and began to decline (Figure 3). The disease remained prevalent in the UK for an 
extended period, demonstrating the difficulties in eradicating highly infectious animal 
diseases. 
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ties were involved during the first fifteen weeks of the outbreak (Figure 4), which 
697 confirmed cases, involving 1,012,242 animals. The epidemic eventually 
over 3.5 million animals being slaughtered. 2.3 million,of these were culled for 
e purposes - clearly demonstrating that responses to outbreaks of highly infectious 
ases can prove more costly than the infections themselves. Other indirect effects 
worthy of note include the suicides of farmers, the postponement of the General Election, 
estimates that the cost of the epidemic would surpass £40 billion, fears over air and water 
pollution through the disposal of carcases, and the withdrawal of UK forces from NATO 
exercises to prevent the spread of disease.133  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Counties in the UK which suffered from FDM during the 2001.epidemic 
 
 
2.2  Historical Precedents of the Anti-Animal Threat 
 
Wheelis134 established that anti-animal biological sabotage (AABS) operations were carried 
out by Germany in at least five countries during World War I. It would appear France was 
also engaged in similar activities and surviving intelligence archives in the UK indicate a 
number of other European countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium and Eire, had 
indicated their interest in pursuing this form of biological warfare.135
 During World War II several other countries became interested in anti-animal biological 
warfare. Project Vegetarian, involving the construction of anthrax-laced cattle cakes by the 
UK, has been well documented.136  The Japanese developed tactical munitions designed to 
infect a variety of targets, including animals.137 Simultaneously, Unit 100 - the Kwantung 
Army Anti-Epizootic Protection of Horses Unit, conducted research into “the mass 
extermination of animals”.138  It also appears that Germany was close to obtaining an anti-
animal capability by 1945.139  
 After World War II and throughout the Cold War, the US engaged, with varying degrees 
of conviction, in a range of AABW projects which produced strategic, tactical and sabotage 
weapons. The UK appears to have redirected its efforts to focus on offensive foot-and-mouth 
disease research.140  Little is known about the AABW components of the program of the 
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former Soviet Union, but Alibek has alleged that “A special division was established to 
research and manufacture anti-livestock and anti-crop weapons”. 141
 Since the end of the Cold War other programs have come to light, including one run by 
South Africa. Although there are no details indicating the presence of an AABW component, 
allegations have been made, and are yet to be disproved, connecting an unusual veterinary 
anthrax outbreak in the region to this program. It also appears that UNSCOM did not 
investigate the existence of AABW activities in Iraq.142  It is unclear whether UNMOVIC or 
the Iraq Survey Group have examined such a possibility. 
 
3.3 Modern Advances and their Implication for the Anti-Animal Threat 
 
There are a number of general themes which can be drawn out of this history. Elucidating 
these ‘rules of thumb’ may provide an insight into the nature of the threat posed by these 
weapons in the future and the possible effect of the revolution in the biological sciences. 
These include, firstly, two separate methodological approaches to this form of warfare:  
 
(1) ‘Military’ AABW programs - included the mass production of the agent, delivery 
devices, and required a degree of control over the resulting disease outbreak. Such 
programs saw the development of strategic, tactical, and point-source weapons. 
(2) ‘Clandestine’ AABW programs – were designed to induce outbreaks through AABS. 
These programs relied heavily on the characteristics of the agents, allowing more 
rudimentary agent production and minimal dispersal technology. They often saw the 
initiation of epidemics and/or the creation of endemic status as desirable outcomes and 
more closely resembled a ‘bioterrorist’ threat.  
 
 Secondly, AABW has been targeted tactically (to impede military utility), socially (to 
disrupt food production), and economically (to induce financial burdens).143 Situations may 
exist in the world where each targeting approach is still desirable.  
 Thirdly, there are desirable characteristics for ‘military’ and ‘clandestine’ biological 
weapons. Some indicative characteristics are listed in Table 3 
 
Table 3: Some Desirable Characteristics of Military and Clandestine Anti-Animal Biological 
Weapons 
Mlitary Programmes Clandestine Programmes 
An agent should produce a known effect 
consistently. 
An agent should produce a known effect 
consistently. 
The dose needed to produce the effect should be 
low. 
An agent should be highly infectious 
There should be a short predictable incubation 
period. 
There should be a long sub-clinical infectious 
period.  
The target population should have little or no 
immunity. 
An agent should pose a significant threat to 
livestock production (or associated industries) 
Treatment for the disease should not be easily 
available to the target population. 
The dose needed to produce the effect should be 
low. 
The user should have means to protect their own 
animals. 
The disease should not be zoonotic. 
The disease should not be zoonotic. The disease should be epidemiologically 
explainable. 
It should be possible to mass-produce the agent. It should be possible to store the agent for short 
periods of time. 
It should be possible to disseminate the agent 
efficiently. 
 
It should be stable in storage and in munitions.  
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 Finally, the innate properties of the pathogens have been utilized in attempts to achieve 
the desirable characteristics. This has included: 
 
(A) Infectivity – in ‘military’ programs minimal lateral transmission facilitated 
control over the resulting outbreak, and for the ‘clandestine’ programs there 
were a number of “transmissible diseases which have the potential for very 
serious or rapid spread, irrespective of national boarders”.144 
(B) Lethality – agents were produced representing a spectrum of effect, ranging 
from the lethal to incapacitants. 
(C) Ability to be disguised as natural events – animal diseases emerge periodically 
in unusual geographical circumstances and differentiation between natural and 
unnatural origins may be more complex than with other forms of BW.145 This 
is especially true of ‘clandestine’ programs which may intentionally mimic 
natural events. 
 
 The revolution in the biological sciences should facilitate developments which have 
implications for both the advancement and prevention of AABW. Such developments can be 
characterized as either offensive or defensive. Possible offensive and defensive developments 
are listed in Table 4.  
 Analysis146 appears to indicate defensive developments designed to counter a ‘military’ 
threat, such as the development of novel prophylactic and therapeutic protocols or improved 
epidemiological surveillance, could be manifested in the short-term. Further-reaching 
defensive developments, such as improved hand-held / transportable sensor technologies and 
special resource allocation to animal health and its interface with public health architecture 
designed to counter the clandestine threat may be more realistically achievable in the 
medium-term. 
 Offensive developments for military programs, such as enhanced agent stability and 
environmental resistance or the creation of novel agents, could be attainable in the short to 
medium-term. As it can be argued that AABW is more likely to be utilized in scenarios rather 
than between developed countries147 (which are also those currently possessing the scientific 
and technological base to take advantage of the revolution in biological sciences) additional 
time may be required to enhance existing capabilities to a degree sufficient to enable such 
applications. Hence, these developments may be more likely to occur in the medium-term.  
 Offensive developments for clandestine programmes are unlikely to be manifested in 
anything less than the long-term. Although improvements, such as the directed evolution of 
natural agents or the development of techniques to enhance the characteristics of non-
traditional agents, will become scientifically possible, it is likely that these manipulations 
would be detectable (using foreseeable technology) through thorough investigation. This 
would reduce the ability to disguise outbreaks as natural events. Identifying such 
manipulations might also provide clues as to the origin of the outbreak. 
 One aspect of the revolution in the biological sciences which has been linked to the future 
threat of BW is proteomics. Although protein-based weapons might be a future threat in the 
anti-personnel or anti-crop fields, it is more contemporary for AABW, especially following 
the discovery of prions. 
Prions have been described as: 
 
novel infectious pathogens that cause a group of fatal neurodegenerative 
disorders termed transmissible spongiform encephalopathies148
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Prions are protein-based agents which appear to lack any genetic material. Although not 
experimentally proven, the favoured hypothesis suggests that prions are replicating, altered 
forms of important neurological proteins.149 They are already responsible for a number of 
important animal diseases, including scrapie in sheep and goats, bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) in mink, chronic 
wasting disease (CWD) in deer and elk, and exotic ungulate encephalopathy in a number of 
exotic ungulates.   
 These prion diseases demonstrate a number of unusual properties, including: 
 
extremely long incubation period from a few months to several years, there are no 
inflammation and no disease-specific immune responses, and they have three 
different manifestations that are unlikely related: infectious, inherited and 
sporadic disorders. 
 
Such properties lend themselves to use as an AABS agent (Table 3), as these agents  
correspond to the latter six desirable characteristics. Although prions appear to be infectious 
they may not be naturally ‘highly infectious’ and the lack of a ‘known effect consistently’ 
produced is likely the result of their recent discovery and may be a situation which will be 
resolved in the future. 
 
3.4  A Future Anti-Animal Threat 
 
Of the biological advances yet to come of age, bioinformatics may prove particularly relevant 
to AABW. Bioinformatics can be considered as the digitization of biology covering all 
aspects of the biology / digital technology interface, ranging from electronically stored 
experimental data to high-throughput laboratory equipment. 
 Bioinformatics may prove crucial in both promoting and combating the ability to disguise 
AABS as a natural event. Next generation automated sensors may well not only be able to 
detect biological agents but also may be able to monitor for tell-tale signs of human 
intervention in the origin of an outbreak – such as genetic manipulation or highly unusual 
epidemiological characteristics.150  It may also prove possible to misuse advances in sensor 
technology. Increasing levels of automation and reduced levels of human interaction with 
detection and diagnostic processes may facilitate malign manipulation in at least two ways: 
 
1. Adding a new desirable characteristic to the desirability of AABW agents – its 
ability to bypass detection equipment; or 
2. Increasing the efficiency of hoaxes – allowing the development of agents 
specifically designed to trigger false alarms (minimizing the risk  that an 
epidemic may spread out of control). 
 
It is to be hoped that the ultimate manifestation of sensor technology would be a system 
which can analyze genotype, phenotype, and possibly proteotype in real time and one which 
could use global epidemiological databases to conduct simple analysis of the nature of an 
outbreak. Many bioinformatic sub-disciplines would be crucial in the development of such 
sensor technology. 
 The trend towards electronically storing biological data has implications for biological 
warfare. Increases in the availability of information and decreases in the time-frame and 
resources required to access this information would provide a firm foundation for the 
development of novel technologies to confront the biological threat. A prime example of such 
a development has occurred in the USA where new biosecurity legislation has been 
* Paper commissioned by The Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project, Center for International Security 
Studies, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, USA. 
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formulated which should decrease the potential for biological agents or dual-use technology 
to be diverted from their intended use. If the data are not properly digitally secured, however, 
it may actually facilitate the efforts of potential proliferators. For example, if the locations and 
security measures relating to Select Agents gathered in partial fulfilment of obligations under 
biosecurity legislation were accessed for malign purposes, it could become a ‘shopping-list’ 
of raw-parts for a BW program. Although it appears that measures are in place to minimize 
such an eventuality, it is to be hoped that equal attention will be given to animal-related 
capabilities and the Department of Agriculture will receive resources proportional to the 
magnitude of this task. 
 The potential for the future misuse of bioinformatics has already begun to be 
manifested. The recent creation of a polio virus151 from its electronically stored genome using 
high-throughput digital machines demonstrates the need to ensure bioinformatic resources are 
used in a responsible manner. It is hoped that early attention to such issues can ensure this and 
other important biological advances are only used for the benefit of mankind.  
 
 
 
Table 4.  Possible offensive and defensive developments in anti-animal biological warfare. 
Note: this table is a generalization. It is possible to envisage military and clandestine scenarios which would require alternative 
characteristics. 
 
Desirable Characteristic Possible Offensive Developments Possible Defensive Developments 
 For A Military Threat For A Clandestine Threat  Against a Military Threat  Against A Clandestine 
Threat 
An agent should be highly infectious - 
Directed evolution of natural 
agents through advanced 
systems biology to 
preferentially increase 
infectivity. 
- 
Novel prophylactics, therapies and 
anti-infectious agents derived 
from advances from may of the 
biological sciences and designed 
to counter the infectivity of the 
pathogens, 
An agent should pose a significant 
threat to livestock production (or 
associated industries) 
- 
Developing techniques to 
enhance the characteristics of 
agents on the OIE class A and 
B pathogen lists that have not 
previously been considered 
candidates for anti-animal 
biological warfare.  
- 
Improved prophylactics and 
therapies which could be created 
from scratch faster, more safely 
and the development of 
biochemical protocols designed to 
minimise the impact of diseases 
on the animal production industry. 
An agent should produce a known 
effect consistently. 
Enhanced manipulation and 
regulation of the biological 
pathways of an agent through 
systems biology, genomics, 
proteomics and bioinformatics.  
Enhanced understanding of 
factors affecting production of 
the effect through advanced 
systems biology.  
Development of novel prophylactic 
and therapeutic protocols which 
could alter the course of an 
infection. 
Development of novel 
prophylactic and therapeutic 
protocols which could alter the 
course of an infection. 
It should be possible to store the 
agent for short periods of time. - 
Enhanced understanding of 
factors affecting agent 
degradation and loss of 
infectivity / pathogenicity 
through advanced systems 
biology. 
- 
Improved hand-held / 
transportable sensor technologies, 
through developments in the field 
of bioinformatics, genomics, and 
proteomics, increasing the 
difficulty of transporting or 
storing pathogens, even short 
distances or for short durations.  
It should be possible to disseminate 
the agent efficiently. 
Enhanced agent stability and 
environmental resistance 
conferred by genetic 
manipulation.  
- 
Development of novel biochemical 
agents to diminish the stability and 
environmental resistance of 
pathogenic agents. 
- 
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It should be possible to mass-
produce the agent. 
Misapplication of advances from 
the field of biotechnology 
combined with conferred 
preferential production 
characteristics through genetic 
manipulation. 
- 
Improved epidemiological 
surveillance and the development of 
remote sensing technology by 
advanced bioinformatics techniques 
to prohibit the illicit mass-
production of biological agents. 
- 
It should be stable in storage and in 
munitions. 
Induced spore formation or 
environmentally stable 
characteristics through genetic 
manipulation  
- 
Creation of agents or biochemical 
agents designed to degrade 
pathogens without a negative impact 
on natural biological systems 
(ensured through increasing 
capabilities in the field of systems 
biology). 
- 
The disease should be 
epidemiologically explainable. - 
Greater understanding of 
epidemiology of animal disease 
outbreaks through 
bioinformatics increasing the 
number of available 
epidemiological explanations. 
- 
Greater understanding of 
epidemiology of animal disease 
outbreaks through bioinformatics 
and systems biology. 
The disease should not be zoonotic. 
Altered biochemical structure to 
prevent infection of human 
tissue. 
Enhanced diseases surveillance 
and future sensor technology 
reducing risk of zoonotic 
outbreak spreading to humans.   
Enhanced interaction and 
information flow across the animal 
health / public health interface. 
Enhanced interaction and 
information flow across the 
animal health / public health 
interface. 
The dose needed to produce the 
effect should be low. 
Increased infectivity and 
pathogenicity through genomic 
and proteomics manipulation. 
Directed evolution of natural 
agents through advanced 
systems biology to 
preferentially increase 
infectivity and pathogenicity. 
Improved disease surveillance and 
sensor technologies negating some 
of the advantages of reduced doses 
combined with enhancements in 
animal immune technologies which 
might require larger doses to be 
overcome.  
Improved disease surveillance and 
sensor technologies negating some 
of the advantages of reduced 
doses combined with 
enhancements in animal immune 
technologies which might require 
larger doses to be overcome.  
The target population should have 
little or no immunity. 
Creation of novel agents for 
which no innate immunity exists, 
or the genomic or proteomic 
manipulation of traditional 
agents. 
- 
Improved specific immunological 
protocols, the development of 
broad-spectrum prophylactics and 
immuno-boosting biochemical 
treatments.  
- 
The user should have means to 
protect their own animals. 
Enhanced control over process of 
infections through systems 
biology, combined with 
enhanced capabilities to develop 
prophylactics and therapies 
derived from advances made in 
almost all biological fields.  
- 
Improved surveillance of disease 
prevention activities through 
advances in bioinformatics. 
- 
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There should be a long sub-clinical 
infectious period.  - 
Directed evolution of natural 
agents through advanced 
systems biology to 
preferentially increase 
infectious period whilst 
suppressing clinical 
presentation. 
- 
Novel biochemical agents 
designed to interfere with the sub-
clinical infectious period of an 
infectious agent and enhanced 
detection and diagnostics 
capabilities allowing earlier 
intervention into the course of an 
outbreak. 
There should be a short predictable 
incubation period. 
Enhanced control over incubation 
through systems biology, 
combined with conferred 
preferential characteristics 
through genetic manipulation. 
- 
Novel biochemical agents designed 
to interfere with the incubation 
processes of an infectious agent and 
enhanced detection and diagnostics 
capabilities allowing earlier 
intervention into the course of an 
outbreak. 
- 
Treatment for the disease should not 
be easily available to the target 
population. 
Creation of novel agents for 
which no treatment currently 
exists, or the genomic or 
proteomic manipulation of 
traditional agents. 
- 
Improved prophylactics and 
therapies which could be created 
from scratch faster and more safely 
which could be proliferated to a 
wider groups of consumers through 
the spread of biotechnology. 
- 
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4  Anti-Plant Threats 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Programs devoted to the development and application of agents152 for use in the 
intentional destruction of plant life have formed an important component in military 
programs. Biological agents have been developed for their military utility in bringing 
about the destruction of a wide variety of plant life including food and cash crops. In 
the civil sector the large scale production of agents for the biological control of plant 
pests and weeds is of increasing relevance to a strengthened international legal against 
biological warfare. And technologies closely related to biological warfare and 
biological control are being developed for use against illicit drug crops. In the age of 
international terrorism, the obvious challenge that the existence of such technologies 
throws up is how, in the light of existing and future scientific and technological 
developments, their hostile use can be prevented without placing regulatory measures 
on science that stifle scientific progress in the area of plant biology?  
 In the first section plant diseases are discussed in the context of their development 
in both military programs and in regard to developments in the civil sector that have 
military applications. In the second section, current capabilities and concerns are then 
discussed in the light of relevant scientific developments in these areas. In the final 
section there is an evaluation of the threat posed by the future development of 
Advanced Biological Warfare (ABW’s) Agents. 
 
4.2  State Programs 
 
The principal intention in military programs has been the development of agents for 
hostile use against an adversary’s food and cash crops. A great number of agents 
pathogenic to plant life were selected for their disease-producing potential including 
bacteria, fungi and viruses transmitted to plants via an agent of dissemination such as 
an insect. While not discussed in any detail here, investigations also involved 
exploring the potential of the physical destruction of plants by insects.   
 Regarded as a first generation153 program, the now widely-acknowledged WWI 
campaign of covert sabotage operations by German agents against livestock is also 
noted as one of the first instances of deliberate disease against crops; as part of this 
campaign, contamination of quantities of wheat took place.154 Mid-century programs 
in France in the later inter-war years, in Germany after the invasion of France, in 
Japan, and in the UK, Canada and in the US, all benefited from the systematic 
scientific study of plant pathology for hostile purposes. Such activities represent a 
second generation in biological warfare programs. Together with anti-crop 
developments in the former Soviet Union and Iraq, each of the above programs 
possessed a central characteristic relating to the selection of anti-plant agents. The 
agents of choice in all of the above programs were fungal plant pathogens – those that 
cause losses amounting to billions of dollars on an annual basis in some of the world’s 
most important food and cash crops. Characteristically, fungal diseases of wheat and 
rice (and other cereals) are spread by means of a hardy microscopic spore and show 
high levels of resistance to environmental degradation. Such pathogens infect the 
aerial parts of plants and cause diseases that have the capability of spreading rapidly 
to epidemic proportions throughout the course of a single growing season.  
 Examples of the role such pathogens have played in the devastation of food crops 
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include the Irish Potato Famine (1845-6) and the Bengal Famine (1943). While the 
French, German, Japanese, UK, Canadian and Iraqi programs were restricted to 
fundamental research and testing with pathogens and insects and were – as far as is 
known - capable of only modest levels of deployment, the programs in the US and the 
former Soviet Union involved great investment and the allocation of considerable 
resources. Both programs resulted in the acquisition of a militarily-significant anti-
crop biological warfare capability, with the former resulting in the standardization of 
munitions and the large-scale stockpiling of agents, and the latter resulting in a large-
scale capability to produce huge quantities of such agents on demand.   
 Anti-crop agents standardized by the US, anti-crop agents listed as under review 
in 1969, anti-crop agents in the former Soviet Union; and anti-crop agents in Iraq are 
described below (Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Anti-crop Agents 
 
Agents standardized by 
the US155
Agents listed as under 
review in 1969156
Anti-crop agents in 
the former Soviet 
Union157
Anti-crop agents 
in Iraq158
causal agent of stem rust 
of wheat (Puccinia 
graminis code named TX 
Puccinia gramins var. 
tritici Erikss. & Henn., 
race 56. 
causal agents of 
diseases affecting 
wheat 
causal agent of 
‘cover smut’ or 
stinking smut or 
bunt of wheat 
fungus of the genus 
Tilletia 
causal agent of rice blast 
Piricularia oryzae, code 
named LX 
Piricularia oryzae 
Cavara, races 11 and 25 
causal agents of 
diseases affecting rice 
 
causal agent of late blight 
of potatoes Phytophthora 
infestans code named LO 
causal agent of diseases 
of wheat and barley, 
Puccinia striiformis 
West 
causal agents of 
diseases affecting corn 
 
causal agent of stem rust 
of rye code named SX 
causal agent of diseases 
of rice, wheat, corn, 
barley, rye, sorgum, Hoja 
blanca virus transmitted 
by plant hopper, Sogata 
orizicola 
causal agents of 
diseases affecting rye 
 
Identity of 5th agent not 
available in the public 
domain 
causal agent of diseases 
of rice Xanthomonas 
oryzae Uyeda and 
Ishiyama 
  
 causal agent of downy 
mildew of poppy and 
diseases of papaver and 
argemone, Peronospora 
arborescens 
  
 
The above listed agents can be regarded as indicative of those ‘classical’ anti-crop 
biological warfare agents that were under development in second generation 
biological warfare programs. These include fungal plant pathogens that affect the 
world’s most economically and socially significant food and cash crops. However, it 
is important to note that a much greater number than those described above of 
naturally occurring, unmodified agents pose a significant threat to food and cash 
crops. For example, if we consider the situation in only one country, as Wheelis and 
Madden159 observe, there are “…many thousands of plant diseases in the United 
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States, and an exact number is probably impossible to determine. Over 13,000 unique 
fungal plant pathogen species  …and over 75,000 plant-fungus combinations (because 
a single pathogen species may infect many host plant species) [are listed by one 
source]. A given crop species such as wheat may be affected by over 200 different 
diseases worldwide.”  
 It is also worth noting that although the program in the former Soviet Union is 
regarded as a third-generation program - due to the existence of secondary-source 
evidence of the application to pathogens of techniques of genetic modification160 - the 
available evidence does not appear to suggest that anti-crop warfare pathogens were 
subject to manipulation during the course of this program. The latter may also be true 
of the anti-crop program in Iraq. An explanation as to why a capability was developed 
in the latter two countries based on a classical anti-crop BW agent is advanced in the 
final section. The following paragraphs consider developments in the civil sector that 
have military applications  
 
4.3  Biological Control and Plant Inoculants 
 
A recent initiative has attempted to highlight the importance of strengthening the 
international legal prohibition against the threat posed by plant pathogens used in the 
civil sector for peaceful purposes. Raised at the official level, the head of the South 
African delegation to the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) notes the increasing threat posed by the large scale 
production of plant inoculants and biocontrol agents used routinely in agriculture in 
the control of plant pests and weeds. The argument put forward relating to these 
agents is that, due to their dual-use capabilities, production facilities should be the 
subject of declarations under a strengthened BTWC. However, our interest here is in 
developing an appreciation of the plethora of organisms that could be used as possible 
plant inoculants and biocontrol agents and their possible use for malign purposes.  
 Plant inoculants are formulations containing living microorganisms, used in the 
treatment and propagation of seeds and plant propagation materiel for enhancing 
growth and disease resistance in plants. They are also used for the restoration of the 
microflora of soil. Unsophisticated technology is required for the production of dry 
peat-based formulations, and large quantities of this form of plant inoculant can be 
disseminated over crops. Sophisticated production facilities are required in the large-
scale production of liquid formulations and could easily be switched to the production 
of plant inoculants for malign purposes.  Future developments in regard to the 
delivery methods for plant inoculants in both dried (powder) and liquid (aerosolized) 
forms may further increase the future malign utility of this technology.  
 Biocontrol agents are living organisms, such as bacteria, fungi, insects, mites or 
weeds, or microorganisms that are used in the control of microbes or other organisms. 
A large number of biocontrol agents are currently available, for example, in the US, 
where they are marketed as biopesticides and include bacteria such as Agrobacterium, 
the widely-used Bacillus thuringiensis that produces a protein toxic to species of 
insects pests belonging to the orders lepidoptera (caterpillars), diptera (flies), and 
coleoptera (beetles and weevils), Pseudomonas, and Streptomyces. Further 
biopesticides include fungi such as Ampelomyces, Candida, Coniothyrium, and 
Trichoderma.161 Interestingly, the scientific literature162 on biocontrol agents contains 
references that are freely available, giving details of fermentation techniques used in 
the rapid and large-scale production of such agents. Indeed the literature contains 
references to production methods that require only limited resources, and there is 
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increasing emphasis in the above areas on research into genetic manipulation in order 
to increase the effectiveness of such agents. In addition, a number of biocontrol agents 
with the above properties are awaiting registration (for example, in the US, with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)) but are publicly available for purchase as 
growth promoters and plant strengtheners. Other uses for plant inoculants and 
biocontrol agents have proved controversial. 
 
4.4  Anti-narcotics 
 
The use of biocontrol agents has been envisaged in connection with the destruction of 
illicit drug crops. In this connection, Fusarium fungi (affecting cannabis and coca) 
and Pleospora fungi (affecting poppy plants) have been developed as potential 
biocontrol agents. Conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Drug Control 
Program (UNDCP) the US has financed research into fungal pathogens of coca and 
cannabis, and US and UK financed research into fungal pathogens of poppy has been 
conducted in Uzbekistan.163 An ongoing debate raises doubts over claims regarding 
the host specificity of such organisms, and concern remains over the potential 
implications of the impact of these agents on complex ecosystems. Although no 
primary source data appears to be available giving the details of above anti-narcotics 
research programs one author has commented on the extent to which research on anti-
narcotics biological control agents has featured genetic manipulation aimed at 
enhancing the target specificity and the virulence of these organisms. This secondary 
source features some limited evidence of the way in which advanced techniques may 
have been applied in the above programs. According to Hogshire,164 research 
scientists have conducted experimentation into manipulating the gene responsible for 
Fusarium’s destructive effect on coca. This has included isolating, “...a gene for the 
24kDa protein from Fusarium oxysporum and [developing] a transformation system 
in Fusarium oxysporum to allow alteration of the gene expression.” The following 
section describes developments in the area of civil plant biotechnology. 
 
4.5  Genetic Modification 
 
Negotiations by states parties under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Group to develop a 
means by which compliance with the BTWC could be verified through the 
implementation of a legally binding Protocol resulted in the production of a list of 
plant pathogens of concern. While not definitive in its scope the list – which was 
designed to assist states parties in filing their respective declarations - assessed agents 
against criteria where agents of concern were judged as such due to having been: 
either the subject of research and development in biological warfare programs and 
developed as weapons, or agents that cause severe socio-economic damage to staple 
crops. The list is interesting in that it raises official concern over the future prospect 
that agents with BW potential might be subject to genetic manipulation (see Appendix 
A). The list includes both bacteria and fungi that affect a broad host spectrum of 
important food and cash crops as likely candidates for genetic manipulation but no 
information is available from this source as to how these pathogens might be 
modified.  
 While there is little evidence to suggest that applications from genome studies 
were used in past anti-crop biological warfare programs, given recent advances in 
genomics, it would be irresponsible to assume that such techniques are not being or 
will not be applied in current or future third-generation offensive biological warfare 
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programs. Indeed, a number of major developments impacting on phytopathology 
appear to support this line of reasoning. 
 In the last ten years, genome studies have facilitated manipulation of the genetic 
characteristics of food crops.  Some examples are as follows. Crops can now be 
produced with built in defences against insect predators (such as Bacillus thurigensis 
as discussed above). Crop varieties can be tailored to confer tolerance to drought or 
salt or resistance to herbicides. They can also be manipulated to delay ripening, as in 
the case of the slow-ripening Flavr Savr tomato, which was approved for sale in the 
US in 1994.  Infertility can be conferred on plant seeds, as in the case of the 
controversial Terminator gene. It has been possible to produce genetically modified 
strains of rice with increased levels of vitamins and iron.  Some 40 genetically 
modified crops and microorganisms had been approved for sale by US regulatory 
authorities by 1998, with almost half of US soya production resulting from 
genetically-modified varieties in 1999.   
 Four major areas of research and development in plant genomics are of relevance. 
One rapidly developing area of research involves studies into the reaction of plants to 
pathogen invasion and the development of disease. Related research led to the 
discovery of a protein called harpin that is used prior to pathogen invasion to activate 
crop defenses. In order to confer resistance to plant diseases, the genes involved in 
resistance are being gradually identified. Another promising area of research and 
development concerns protecting plants from disease through a concept referred to as 
‘pathogen-derived resistance’. This involves genes that are engineered into plants that 
are derived from the pathogens themselves. A third area of research concerns 
investigations into the role of antimicrobial peptides and proteins that confer 
antimicrobial properties on plants, thus strengthening immunity and resistance to 
fungal and bacterial plant pathogens. With the objective of conferring a level of 
immunity or resistance to a pathogen, the fourth area concerns the development 
genetically engineered plants to express an antibody against a protein that is found to 
be crucial to the process of pathogenesis.  
 In addition  to the above, there are already a number of plant-derived recombinant 
human proteins used in pharmaceuticals.165  Research in plant pathology into bacterial 
pathogens has also revealed recently a number of previously unknown natural 
chemical products such as pyrrolnitrin produced by Pseudomonas bacteria that is used 
in the manufacture of a broad-spectrum chemical fungicide. Analysts have already 
begun thinking through the possibilities of how plant pathogens might be manipulated 
for malign purposes. A simple scenario, according to Kagan,166 might be to simply 
insert noxious DNA material in the form of a bioregulator into a biocontrol agent such 
as Bacillus thruingiensis that would be present in sufficiently large quantities to 
contaminate the food-supply chain of a country, region, or economic zone.   
 The complete genome sequence for Ralstonia solanacearum,167 one of the most 
devastating soil borne plant pathogens affecting an unusually wide host range of 
plants globally, was published recently. This is likely to advance considerably our 
future understanding of the molecular determinants that govern an organism’s 
pathogenicity. It is important to note that the above developments open up a range of 
possibilities for the hostile use of plant pathogens across the biochemical spectrum 
and it is easy to envisage that genome studies in plants could be used now and in the 
future for malign purposes. The following section turns briefly to deal with the matter 
of future Advanced Biological Warfare Agents. 
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4.6  Advanced Biological Warfare Agents 
 
It is possible to envisage that advanced agents might emerge inadvertantly as a result 
of scientists working with plant pathogens, as appears to have been the case in animal 
biology where scientists attempting to develop a contraceptive vaccine for mice from 
a relatively benign strain of mouse pox virus resulted in the development of a lethal 
agent.168  It may be possible to construct a plant pathogen from respective component 
parts as has been achieved recently in the case of the construction of human polio 
virus.169 It may also be possible to envisage the production of plant pathogens with 
novel characteristics or it may be possible to engineer a pathogen in such a way that it 
becomes lethal to a broad host spectrum of plant life. It is possible to envisage the 
near eradication of an entire species from world regions as in the case of elm trees 
destroyed in some parts of the US and parts of Europe by a non-indigenous exotic 
fungal plant pathogen.170 It would be naïve to ignore the future possibility that 
advanced anti-crop biological warfare agents might result in the total extinction of 
plant species. While such pathogens are easy to envisage, their production would 
require significant scientific investment and infrastructure. 
 However, given the potential of naturally occurring and genetically modified 
organisms against food, cash crops and other plant life, and the inherent 
vulnerabilities associated with large-scale agricultural practices in advanced 
industrialised countries, it is hard to envisage the need for advanced anti-crop 
biological weapons. J.E. van der Plank171 writing in the early 1960 warned of the 
threat posed by naturally occurring plant pathogens that increase at a rate of 40% per 
day over several months. In commenting on the threat posed by the spores produced 
by wheat stem rust fungus van der Plank notes, “….Many types of spores disperse as 
easily as smoke. Many are tough and durable. They have only to be dispersed in the 
proper places at the proper times. Nature sees to the explosion….An enemy need only 
introduce the appropriate races, and resistance will vanish.” Wheelis172 notes that 
large-scale high-density production and a reliance on monoculture where there is a 
restricted range of genotypes make agriculture in advanced industrialised countries 
particularly vulnerable to naturally occurring but exotic pathogens to which crops can 
offer no resistance.  
 The number of naturally occurring plant pathogens that pose a risk to plant life is 
at present unquantifyable. A great deal more work needs to be done regarding the 
identification of the number pathogens and pathogen-host combinations. Genetically 
modified plant pathogens would place great strain on plant extension services that 
struggle to address the problem of pathogens that are naturally occurring in the 
environment. It is hard to envisage the need for the development of advanced anti-
crop biological weapons but if we consider a worst case scenario for plant life, it is 
possible to envisage the future extinction of the plant species upon which the world’s 
burgeoning populations are increasingly reliant for the production of food.  
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III. Overall Conclusions 
 
In its report on Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, the Fink Committee 
on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of 
Biotechnology recommended that seven categories of experiment should be subject to 
review. However, it clearly believed that these categories were only the initial stages 
in a developing system of review, stating that: “The system proposed in this report is 
intended as a first step in what will be a long and continuously evolving process to 
maintain an optimal balance of risks and rewards.”  
 The kinds of threats discussed in the various sections of the present report clearly 
demonstrate the correctness of this view.  The possibility of the production of novel 
agents is at present and will in the future continue to be of concern, as expressed in all 
sections of this report. The modern techniques of molecular biology, including 
genomics and proteomics will promote the elucidation of the mechanisms of 
pathogenicity and in particular the interaction of agents with cell receptors. These 
activities are essential in leading a more effective battle against disease, but at the 
same time they exacerbate the dilemma of dual use, in that the information gained can 
more easily serve malign intent. The research oversight system proposed by the 
University of Maryland group173 could deal adequately with this type of research that 
is focussed on pathogens. 
 The present report tries to view the dual-use dilemma within a broader scope of 
consequences by focussing on the real target of malign use, biological systems that 
are interactive.  In this respect, the perturbation of one system by malign agents will 
necessarily affect another. This can be seen most clearly in the interactions of the 
immune system with the neuroendocrine systems of humans and animals and points 
up the necessity to come to grips with bioregulators in a heightened arena.  However, 
plants are also acutely affected by systems biology through their own innate immune 
system as well as other systems involved in interactions with pathogenic agents. 
Attacks on the neuroendocrine and immune systems are intimately related to 
developments in targeting technology. When the attacks use modified microorganisms 
to deliver the modulators, this would also be covered in the University of Maryland 
oversight system. However, the present report raises questions about activities that are 
outside of the system in its present form, such as the delivery of modulators using 
immunotoxins or fusion proteins, which are not microorganisms. The possibility of 
immune evasion is of particular concern, and any research that would allow a 
microorganism to evade the immune system must be considered extremely dangerous. 
Modulation of the immune system using bioregulators would fall into this category. It 
is therefore suggested that an additional type of research be placed in the “Table: 
Illustrative Categories of Research Activities” under the category “Extremely 
Dangerous Activities” to include “work that would allow agents to evade immune 
mechanisms”. This would take into account modulating the immune system using 
immunotoxins or fusion proteins as a delivery system, because even though the 
delivery system is not a microorganism, manipulation of this type would allow a 
pathogenic microorganism to be even more dangerous. 
 In all areas discussed in the paper the directed evolution of natural agents as well 
as developments in bioinformatics are seen as further areas of particular concern for 
the future. 
  How proposals designed to “maintain an optimal balance of risks and rewards” 
can be applied to the threats delineated in the present report is a matter for further 
discussion. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Plant Pathogens Important for the BTWC 
Name of 
Pathogen 
Disease Caused.   Distribution:   
 
Transmission Control Environmental Stability Ease of production BW potential 
1.  
Colletotrich
um 
coffeanum 
var 
virulans[coff
ee berry 
disease]; 
Causes coffee berry disease.  Can be 
very destructive in terms of yield 
loss and seedling death of this non-
staple food crop but does not kill 
mature plants.  Different races have 
not yet been recorded. 
Central and southern 
Africa. 
Seed borne, rain splash, 
passive vectors such as 
man, birds and 
machinery. 
 Fungicide sprays are not 
effective.  Chemical seed 
treatment not yet 
successfully developed.  
Resistant varieties are 
available. 
Can survive as latent infection.  
Conidiospores have a short life 
but conidia can survive more that 
a year on plant debris 
Can be mass produced on 
artificial substrate but is 
notoriously unstable under 
these condition and loses its 
pathogenicity rapidly. 
Not a staple food and thus 
not regarded as important 
but may cause serious 
world wide economic 
problems.   
 
2. 
Dothistroma 
pini (Scirrhia 
pini) (CMI 
368) [blight 
of pines]; 
Dothistroma blight of pines can be 
highly destructive depending on the 
frequency of infection. 
Europe, Asia, Africa, 
North and South 
America.  Different 
races have not been 
recorded. 
Seed borne, wind, 
clouds may carry spore 
inoculum.   
 
Resistant pine species are 
available.  Non-systemic 
fungicide spray show some 
activity but are not practical 
and economically viable. 
Inoculum viability debris limited 
to 2-6 months. 
Mass production of the pathogen 
is easily done on artificial 
substraits. 
 Is good although pine is 
not a staple food it is of 
strategic [significance?] 
 
3.Erwinia 
amyovora 
(CMI 44) 
[fire blight 
of apple, 
pear, quince 
and related 
species]; 
 
Fire blight of apple, 
pear, quince and 
related species is very 
destructive.  Not yet 
recorded in South 
Africa. 
 
North America, 
Central America, 
New Zealand, Japan, 
China, Europe, 
North Africa. 
Water, vegetative 
material, insects 
Eradicate infected material.  
Chemical and antibiotic 
sprays not very successful.  
The bacteria is not stable in 
the environment outside its 
host material.  This 
pathogen can easily be 
produced in commercial 
fermenters. 
   Good.
4.Pseudomo
na 
solanacearu
m (CMI 15) 
[wilt 
associated 
with 
numerous 
hosts 
particularly  
potato, 
tomato and 
tobacco];  
Potato, tomato and tobacco wilt; 
slime disease, Granville wilt; 
bacterial ring disease, Moko disease 
of banana are some of the most 
devastating diseases caused by this 
bacterium which attack numerous 
hosts of Solanaceae, Musaceae, 
Compositae, Fabacea, etc.  Different 
races of the bacterium occurs which 
combined with its broad host range 
make breeding for residence 
difficult.   
 
Tropical, subtropial 
and warm temperate 
parts of: Asia, 
Africa, Australasia, 
Europe, West 
Indies, North and 
Central America.   
 
Infected materia, 
contaminated soil, 
water, implements 
No effective 
chemical 
treatments 
available.  
Resistant 
cultivars of 
varieties but 
new races 
develop 
continuously.   
The bacterium is stable in 
soil and host tissue.  Spores 
are not produced and 
vegetative unprotected cells 
have limited life span.  
Easily produced in relatively 
simple ferments.  
 
   Excellent.
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5.  
Pyricularia 
[Piricularia] 
orzae (CMI 
169) [rice 
blast 
disease]; 
Blast disease of rice can be very 
destructive (90%) on this staple 
food.  With its many races (219) 
and broad host spectrum, breeding 
for resistance is complex.  The 
fungus needs high temperature and 
humidity for infection.   
 
Widespread; Africa, 
Asia, Australasia, 
Europe, N. America, 
S. America, C 
America, W. Indies. 
Wind.   
 
Resistant 
cultivars, 
sprays of 
environmentall
y harmful 
fungicides can 
be effective.   
 
Stable, overwinters on straw and 
debris from reinfection takes 
place. Can easily be mass 
produced. 
 Good 
 
6.  Ustilago 
Maydis 
(CMI 79) 
[maize smut, 
blister smut 
and common 
smut]; 
 
Maize smut, Common smut, Blister 
smut can cause appreciable losses 
(10-17%).  In addition, the spores 
can induce allergic reaction in man 
and may be toxic to animals and 
man.  More than 500 races have 
been noted complicating the search 
for resistance.   
 
Worldwide where 
maize (corn) is 
grown except New 
Zealand 
Wind, seed surface 
borne, contaminated 
soil. 
Heat or chemical seed 
treatment but this is useless 
where soil is contaminated.  
Possibly resistant cultivars. 
is excellent.  Spores remained 
viable after 8 years in dry soil.  
Can be mass produced on 
artificial substrates 
  Good.
 
7. 
Xanthomona
s albilineans 
(CMI 18); 
This bacterium causes 
leaf scald on sugarcane 
where [it] can become 
highly destructive.  It 
has a wide host range 
and can occur on maize 
and a number of grass 
species.  The large 
number of races 
complicates breeding 
for resistance.   
 
Africa, Central & 
South America, 
Asia, Australasia. 
 
Infected sets, Aerial 
dispersal, Insects, 
Rodents.  
 
Heat treatment of sets, 
resistant varieties.  No 
chemical treatment 
available. 
The bacterium does not produce 
resistant spores.  Disease may 
remain dormant as systemic 
infection until environmental 
conditions favours symptom 
expression. The bacterium can 
easily be mass produced in 
simple commercial fermenters. 
 
  Good.
 
8.  
Xanthomana
s compestris 
pv. oryzae 
(CMI 239) 
The broad host range bacterium 
causes bacterial blight of rice and 
Kresek disease of rice.  Kresek is 
caused by the systemic infection in 
the tropics and is extremely 
destructive.  Differences in 
pathogenicity between isolates have 
been reported but there are no 
differential varietal reaction to 
complicate breeding for resistance.   
 
Asia, Africa, S. 
America, Mexico, 
Korea, Taiwan, 
Indonesia 
Wind, Rain, Flood, 
vegetative material, 
Seed borne. 
 
Chemical seed treatment,  
Resistant cultivars, 
Elimination of volunteers.  
Chemical spray not 
successful 
Does not produce resistant or 
hardy spores.  Overwinters on 
volunteers or in weed 
shizosphere.  Survival on debris 
seem limited. Can be easily mass 
produced in simple commercial 
fermenters. 
 
 Medium to good.  
Candidate for genetic 
manipulation.   
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9.  Tilletia 
tritici [cover 
smut, 
stinking 
smut and 
common 
bunt of 
wheat] 
Cover smut, Stinking smut, 
Common bunt of wheat is caused by 
this broad host range fungus 
pathogen which has a single host 
life cycle.  The fungus attacks the 
inflorescence [flower] replacing the 
kernels with bunt balls of black 
teliospores.  The disease is regarded 
as very important, it suppresses 
yields and lowers the quality and 
smelly trimethylamine is produced 
while the spores may ignite and 
cause an explosion during 
harvesting. 
Worldwide. 
 
Seed surface borne, 
Wind, contaminated 
soil. 
Resistant cultivars - they are 
short lived because new 
races continuously develop.  
Chemical seed treatment. 
Teliospores can survive up to 2 
years in soil.  Production of this 
obligate parasite needs live hosts 
but as vast numbers of spores can 
be harvested, mass production in 
not impossible. 
 Good.  Could possibly be 
enhanced by genetic 
manipulation. 
10.  
Sclerotinia 
Sclerotorium 
(CMI 513) 
[cottony soft 
rot and white 
mould of 
vegetables, 
beans, 
sunflower, 
groundnuts 
and soya 
beans]. 
This plurivourous fungus causes 
cottony soft rot, white mold, and 
watery soft rot on a broad host 
spectrum such as vegetables, beans, 
sunflower, groundnuts soya bean 
and many others except cereals and 
woody plants.  The fungus can 
attack any above ground parts at 
any development stage and is 
extremely destructive under cooler 
moist conditions as found under 
irrigation. 
Worldwide.   Airborne ascospores,
Seed infected with 
mycelium or 
contaminated with 
sclerotia (survival 
structure). 
 Airborne ascospores, Seed 
infected with mycelium or 
contaminated with sclerotia 
(survival structure). 
High.  Good candidate 
for genetic manipulation 
to broaden its 
temperature spectrum. 
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